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Proposal for a Single Securities Commission: 









This report analyzes and comments on the principal arguments put forward by the Crawford 
Panel to support the establishment of a single securities commission in Canada. 
 
One argument advanced is that the current rules-based regulatory structure should be replaced 
with a principles-based approach similar to that of the United Kingdom’s Alternative Investment 
Market  (AIM).  According  to  the  Panel,  this  approach  would  allow  for  a  relaxation  of  the 
conditions for corporate financing. We will point out the very distinctive characteristics of the 
Canadian market, which allows emerging companies—those without income and even without 
any revenue—to carry out initial and subsequent rounds of financing. Our estimates indicate that 
such financing is carried out at an advantageous cost, and the survival of new issuers seems more 
certain in Canada than in other countries where the rules for listing on a stock exchange are more 
restrictive. We believe it would be difficult to further relax the rules of a market in which 45% of 
issuers are able to list their securities on a stock exchange without reporting any revenue and in 
which 71% of new exchange registrants do not earn any income. This situation is unparalleled in 
the world. We will show that adopting a system similar to the AIM model would result in a 
significant percentage of existing issuers no longer being able to access the market. We therefore 
concur fully with the opinion expressed by one of the experts enlisted by the Panel, namely, that 
adopting a system similar to the AIM model in Canada is neither feasible nor desirable. 
 
The Panel expressed concern about the conditions for the financing of junior issuers. We will 
show that, in general, the direct costs of such financings are lower in Canada than in the United 
States. We will see that, in fact, there is a very high number of small offerings and issues in 
Canada. The Canadian markets seem to have developed strategies that are well suited to the 
characteristics of an economy heavily dependent on small-cap companies and on the resource 
sector. An analysis of all financings, including traditional and non-traditional stock exchange 
listings as well as subsequent financings (a total of more than 10,000 transactions), clearly shows 
that financings are very small and are carried out locally and, in 77% of cases, by issuers from 
outside Ontario. 
 
The Panel also expressed concern about the level of competitiveness of the Canadian market; this 
is a concern that we share. We will show that the principal challenge faced by the Canadian 
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market is the gradual shift of transactions involving cross-listed securities to the U.S. market. In 
contrast to the Panel, we do not believe that AIM listings constitute a major problem. When 
Canadian companies cross-list their securities, they opt for the U.S. market at a ratio of eight to 
one. The migration of companies and transactions towards the U.S. market has many causes, but 
it would be very difficult to argue that the regulatory structure is a key factor. The argument 
whereby the costs of capital are lower in the U.S. does not stand up to analysis. Several recent 
and thorough studies indicate that the difference in these costs between the two countries is 
minimal, leaning in favour of one country or the other depending on the study. Our own findings 
show that Canadian companies that cross-list their securities do not benefit from any lower costs. 
The decision to list securities on a foreign market is driven primarily by strategic business factors 
and by the search for large pools of investors. In that regard, Canada has no advantage, and it 
seems unlikely that regulatory changes will convert Canada into a significant source of financing 
for foreign companies. In our opinion, efforts should be focused, above all, on improving and 
sustaining the financing options available to Canadian issuers. 
 
The  Panel  has  argued  that  establishing  a  single  commission  is  necessary  for  improving 
enforcement of securities laws in Canada. In this regard, Canada is often compared to the United 
States. An analysis of data on sanctions shows, firstly, that the SEC is far from being the source 
of the majority of sanctions imposed on financial market participants. It initiates less than 10% of 
proceedings  involving  financial  matters  and  imposes  less  than  one  quarter  of  all  monetary 
sanctions. Secondly, there has been an increase in sanctions imposed in Canada in this area. 
Thirdly,  there  are  major  differences  between  Canada  and  other  countries.  This  explains  the 
differences observed and perceived as regards enforcement. The experts enlisted by the Panel 
have, in fact, recommended a series of eight actions and have suggested, in the eighth item, pan-
Canadian  enforcement  of  the  law.  Consequently,  these  experts  have  not  concluded  that 
centralization  of  the  securities  commissions  is  an  indispensable  condition  for  enhancing  the 
enforcement of securities laws. 
 
The issue of costs arises very often in discussions regarding the Canadian regulatory system. Yet, 
there is little evidence showing that the current regulatory structure leads to significant costs for 
investors or issuers. The costs of the regulatory authorities represent a negligible percentage of 
the transaction costs borne by investors and of revenues from brokerage activities in Canada. The 
direct  costs  of  regulatory  authorities  are  lower  than  those  incurred  in  other  countries,  when 
expressed on the basis of the number of reporting issuers. Finally, arguments to the effect that a 
single commission would generate substantial savings are less than convincing. Such savings 
would be possible only if the activities of securities commissions outside Ontario were virtually 
abolished. 
 
Three  elements  appear  from  our  analysis.  First  and  foremost,  the  principal  arguments  put 
forward by the Panel to justify the urgency of centralizing securities commissions in Canada do 
not stand up to analysis and are, at times, contradicted by the research and the experts mandated 
by the Panel itself. Secondly, the major challenge faced by the Canadian market—the shift of 
enterprises and transactions to the U.S.—does not seem to have been perceived as such or even 
discussed.  Finally,  we  believe  it  is  essential  to  recognize  and  preserve  the  distinctive 
characteristics of the existing market. It is a market that welcomes growth companies and small-
cap companies, is highly decentralized and is apparently very favourable to issuers.   3 
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In its update report dated June 15, 2007, the Crawford Panel (Crawford Panel, 2007) refers to 
its  proposal  for  modernizing  the  Canadian  regulatory  system  that  was  the  subject  of  its 
preceding report, issued in 2006. It notes that certain elements of the proposal have raised 
concerns, including the feasibility of adopting a principles-based regulatory system rather than 
a rules-based system, providing investors with better protection through national enforcement, 
the implications of a single regulator for small issuers and the competitiveness of the Canadian 
market. In its update, the Panel refers to the key elements of certain prior studies and states that 
its recommendations are such as to make Canada ―the best place in the world in which to invest 
and raise capital for small and large businesses.‖ The purpose of this document is to supplement 
and clarify several elements of the update report and discuss the arguments presented therein. 
To do so, we follow a three-step process. In the first part of our paper, we examine several 
characteristics of financings  carried out  in  the  Canadian market,  based on recent  empirical 
studies providing comprehensive and new data. These data are an indispensable foundation for 
discussing the Panel‘s proposals, which is the subject of the second part of our paper. In the 
third part, we discuss and analyze issues relating to the cost of regulation.  
1 THE CANADIAN MARKET GLOBALLY 
The Canadian securities market has very distinctive characteristics—as regards initial offerings 
and stock exchange listings, the rate of survival of initial offerings, subsequent financings, the 
costs of financing, and graduation and migration of issuers to other markets and exchanges—
and it is important that these characteristics be properly described. The Canadian market is also 
characterized by a high degree of dispersion, given that a vast majority of financings take place 
outside Ontario. On the whole, the Canadian market is composed of enterprises with small and 
very small market capitalizations, as Nicholls indicates (2006). According to the various studies 
cited by the Panel, these are the transactions that require the most supervision from securities 
regulators and seem to be burdened most by regulatory requirements.  
1.1 INITIAL OFFERINGS AND EXCHANGE LISTINGS 
Canada  offers  growth  companies  three  ways  to  access  the  securities  market:  traditional 
offerings  (initial  public  offering  or  IPO),  reverse  takeovers  (RTO)  and  the  capital  pool 
companies (CPC) mechanism. This tool is intended to facilitate market access by issuers that do   5 
not satisfy the minimum listing requirements.
1 Through the CPC program, the TSX Venture 
Exchange  offers  ―investors  a  venture  investment  market  with  comprehensive  compliance 
standards.‖
2  The  minimum  listing  standards  are  not  at  all  restrictive.  Table  1  sets  out  the 
characteristics of all initial offerings in Canada since 1986. The median offering size is quite 
small, namely, $1 million for the entire period. Thus, half of initial offerings in Canada during 
this period involved less than $1 million. The median size of issuers, prior to an offering, is 
very small: Half of issuers have pre-offering shareholders‘ equity of less than $310,000. Initial 
Canadian  offerings  are  predominantly  (71%)  carried  out  by  unprofitable  companies,  with 
45.32%  of  issuers  proceeding  with  an  IPO  without  ever  reporting  any  revenue.  Some 
comparisons  are  useful  for  understanding  the  particular  nature  of  the  Canadian  market  as 
regards initial financings. In the United States, out of 4,538 IPOs carried out between 1990 and 
2005, gross proceeds average US$96 million. (Ritter, 2006). The percentage of issuers reporting 
losses  is  38.5%,  namely,  half  of  the  Canadian  figure,  but  NASDAQ  recently  reinstated  a 
profitability  requirement  as  part  of  the  minimum  listing  standards.  The  rules  of  the  new 
European markets (excluding AIM) required that initial offerings exceed 5 million euros. In 
Australia,  the  median  size  of  offerings  between  1995  and  2000  is  approximately  C$7.65 
million.
3 On AIM, median gross proceeds  are approximately C$6.84 million and the median 
post-offering capitalization is approximately C$30 million  (Derrien and Kecskes, 2007). The 
percentage of issuers without revenue is generally not reported in other countries, because it is 
very low. The Canadian initial offerings market is also characterized by the large number of 
resource companies active in that market; they represent 44.33% of offerings between 1986 and 
2003, compared with 9% on AIM. Companies without revenue are largely conc entrated in the 
resource sector. 
                                                 
1 Exchange listings through the use of RTOs are infrequent in other jurisdictions and the SEC has 
revised and tightened the rules governing shell companies used in such transactions: SEC Votes To 
Adopt Securities Act Rule Reform and Shell Company Regulations. Blind pools, on which CPCs are 
based,  are  often  likened  to  frauds.  See  the  warning  issued  by  the  NASAA  at: 
http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/departments/securities/investor_education_services/investor_alert/nv
stalt2.html. 
2  According  to  the  brochure:  Capital  Pool  Company  Program,  TSX  Venture  Exchange, 
http://www.tsx.com/en/pdf/CPCBrochure.pdf 
3  Australia  amended  the  minimum  listing  requirements  in  1999,  introducing  an  A$10  million 
capitalization test as an alternative to the requirement that earnings exceed A$1 million and net tangible 
assets exceed A$2 million. The NSX was reactivated in 2000. It allows companies that do not satisfy the 
minimum listing requirements to be listed. In 2007 it listed 49 issuers.   6 
Table  1  also  sets  out  the  principal  characteristics  of  the  892  companies  that  listed  their 
securities by way of an RTO between 1988 and 2006. These transactions involve median gross 
proceeds of approximately $1.5 million, with median pre-transaction shareholders‘ equity of 
$340,000, an amount similar to that for IPOs. The percentage of issuers without revenue and 
without profits is 40.59% and 75.25%, respectively.  
We also identified 1,311 CPCs between 1991 and 2006, of which 992 completed a qualifying 
transaction  before  June  30,  2007.  The  median  amount  raised  through  these  transactions  is 
approximately $1 million. The average percentage of companies reporting losses is 68.98%, 
with 26.85% reporting no revenue at all. In all, 1,884 Canadian companies—predominantly 
very small companies—used a backdoor listing to access the securities market between 1993 
and 2003. Companies in the United States also used RTOs to obtain exchange listings, but their 
numbers are low: There are 286 such transactions between 1990 and 2002 and they involve 
larger enterprises than in Canada. These enterprises  have median assets  of US$5.4  million 
(Adjei et al., 2007). Moreover, the majority are profitable companies, with a return on assets of 
10.5%.   7 
Table  1  Listings  and  initial  offerings  on  the  Canadian  public  market,  and  principal 
characteristics of issuers. The number of observations is based on the number of transactions 
identified.  The  number  in  parentheses  is  equal  to  the  number  of  observations  for  which 
operating data can be calculated. Median gross proceeds  (GP) are expressed in millions of 
dollars.  For  CPCs,  gross  proceeds  are  equal  to  the  amount  of  the  qualifying  transaction, 
expressed in millions of dollars. Operating data were compiled from the financial statements for 
the most recently completed financial year preceding the offering. The number of CPCs is equal 
to the number of capital pool companies; the number in parentheses is equal to the number of 
qualifying transactions carried out before December 31, 2002, for which operating data were 
available.  
   Offering 
period 
Number  Median GP  Median 
equity 
% Nil sales  % Losses 
Initial offerings  1986-2006  2616 (2028)  1.00  0.31  45.32  71.01 
RTO listings  1988-2006  892 (202)  1.53  0.34  40.59  75.25 
CPC listings  1991-2006  1311 (433)  1.00  0.31  26.85  68.98 
Growth companies in Canada carry out numerous financing activities. We identified 4,500 
exchange  listing  transactions  in  Canada  between  1986  and  2006.
4  On average, each year, 
approximately 214 Canadian companies enter the securities market, representing almost 70% of 
the 313 U.S. initial offerings reported by Ritter (2004),
5 in a market 10 times smaller. Canada is 
often compared with Australia as regards the types of issuers. Between 1995 and 2000, 457 
initial offerings were carried out in Au stralia. In Canada, during the same period, there were 
1,295 listing transactions (IPOs, CPCs, RTOs). It is therefore difficult to argue that access to 
the public market presents a real challenge for emerging companies, given that in 60% of cases 
they are able to access that market without even reporting any income. Based on international 
standards, Canadian offerings are microcap offerings,
6 and the Canadian market allows growth 
companies—those without income and even without any revenue—to carry out initial offerings, 
a possibility not available in any other market. The vast majority of small offerings as well as 
                                                 
4 We were unable to fully examine CPC transactions between 1986 and 1993, because no list exists. We 
therefore underestimated the total number of transactions. 
5 However, U.S. studies do not report offerings carried out at the state level; such offerings are not 
covered by the SEC.  
6 ―The term ‗microcap stock‘ applies to companies with low or ‗micro‘ capitalizations, meaning the total 
value of the company‘s stock. Microcap companies typically have limited assets. For example, in cases 
where the SEC suspended trading in microcap stocks, the average company had only $6 million in net 
tangible assets — and nearly half had less than $1.25 million. Microcap stocks tend to be low priced and 
trade in low volumes.‖ http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm   8 
almost all CPC and RTO listings involve a single regulator, because they are carried out in only 
one province.  
1.2 SURVIVAL 
Despite the fact that listing requirements are minimal, initial issuers have a higher survival rate 
and longer life expectancy in Canada than in the United States. We measured the survival rate 
of IPO issuers after 5 and 10 years, identifying all cases in which issuers were delisted or 
suspended without any resumption of trading, or in which their securities were repurchased at 
very low prices (10 cents or below).
7 Table 2 sets out our estimates and the corresponding data 
in the U.S. After 5 and 10 years, the survival rate for  Canadian issuers is greater than that 
reported in the U.S.
8 The survival rate at 5 years is 88.40%, comparing favourably with the rate 
measured by Demers and Joos (2006) for the same period. Only high -tech offerings have a 
greater probability of survival in the U.S., but they involve median amounts of US$121 million 
and, therefore, have nothing in common with offerings in Canada. The rates at 10 years are 
considerably higher than those observed by Fama and French  (2004) for ―small‖ businesses, 
namely, those with assets below the NASDAQ median. U.S. penny stock IPOs, which are the 
most  comparable  to  Canadian  offerings,  were  analyzed  by  Bradley  et  al.  (2006).  These 
offerings raise an average of US $5.7 million. After 3 years, the survival rate for these issuers is 
68.5%. After 10 years, the survival rate for Canadian issuers is 71.71%. The very high survival 
rate  of  small  Canadian  offerings  is  attributable,  in  part,  to  the  fact  that  listed  emerging 
companies are in a position to carry out subsequent financings before turning a profit. 
                                                 
7 So that our estimates can be compared with U.S. studies, we applied a delisting rule based on U.S. 
standards for maintaining a listing (the penny stock rules). A stock that trades for seven months at a 
price that never exceeds 10 cents is considered to be a failure. 
8 See Carpentier and Suret (2007) for a detailed analysis of the survival rate.    9 
Table 2 Comparison of survival rates at 5 and 10 years for issuers having carried out an 
initial public offering in Canada and in the U.S.; acquired or merged enterprises are 
classified  as  surviving,  except  when  acquired  at  a  price  of  less  than  10  cents  per 
security. 




Duration  Survival rate  
Canada             
Carpentier and Suret (2007)         
  1986-2002  1974  5  88.40% 
  1986-1997  1605  10  71.71% 
United States             
Fama and French (2004)         
  Small businesses  1980-1991  1416*  10  59.50% 
  Large businesses  1980-1991  1416*  10  87.80% 
Demers-Joos (2006)    3973     
  Non HT  1985-2000  16.7  5  83.30% 
  HT + Internet  1985-2000  23.1  5  76.90% 
  High Tech  1985-2000  9.2  5  90.80% 
Bradley et al. (2006)         
  Penny stocks  1990-1998  251  3  68.50% 
  Non-penny stocks  1990-1998  2707  3  93.60% 
      * Estimated based on Table 7 of Fama and French (2004).  
1.3 SUBSEQUENT FINANCINGS 
Canadian reporting issuers often use private placements to raise funds. Table 3 sets out the 
principal characteristics of these types of financing transactions, based on almost all of the 
4,592 placements identified between 1993 and 2003. One out of two private placements involve 
amounts below $3 million. The majority of private placement issuers are small, with median 
shareholders‘ equity of $5.52 million. Of these issuers, 74.15% report losses and 41.94% report 
no revenue. Two thirds of private placement issuers operate in the natural resource sector.  
Although  subsequent  public  offerings  are  larger  than  private  placements  ($8.87  million), 
59.88% of them are carried out by issuers without income, with 25.16% of total issuers having 
no revenue at all. This situation is in stark contrast to the U.S. situation, where subsequent 
offerings are carried out by highly profitable companies and for significant amounts (US$30 
million  to  US$160  million,  according  to  the  studies).  It  does  not  appear  that  unprofitable   10 
companies participate to any significant extent in subsequent offerings in the U.S. As with 
initial offerings, the Canadian market for subsequent offerings clearly differs from those in 
other countries, particularly the U.S., in that it allows emerging companies to obtain subsequent 
financing.  
Table 3 Profile of subsequent financings by Canadian companies between 1993 and 2003. No. 
refers to the number of offerings. GP refers to gross proceeds, expressed in millions of dollars. 
Operating  data  (equity,  sales,  net  income)  were  compiled  for  the  most  recently  completed 
financial year preceding the offering. Shareholders‘ equity is expressed in millions of dollars. 
% NR (natural resources) refers to the number of offerings by mining companies. % OG refers 
to the number of offerings by firms in the oil and gas sector.  












Private placements  4592  3  5.52  41.94  74.15  41.36  26.71 
Public offerings  2862  8.87  19.82  25.16  59.88  28.86  24.15 
 
1.4 FINANCING COSTS 
The cost of financing consists of two principal components. The first is associated with direct 
and indirect costs incurred to raise the funds (costs of offerings) and the second is the rate 
investors expect to earn to make the funds available to businesses.  
1.4.1 Costs of Offerings 
Kooli and Suret (2003) studied the costs of offerings in Canada and the U.S. The following cost 
factors were measured: (1) brokerage fees; (2) other costs appearing in the prospectus, which 
are  related  to  legal  costs,  fees  and  preparation  of  the  prospectus;  and  (3)  the  initial 
undervaluation, which reflects the cost to companies whose securities are disposed of at a lower 
price than what the market will establish. 
Direct costs are significantly higher for small issues than for large issues. Costs can therefore 
only be compared for offerings of similar size. Table 4 shows that the average total direct cost 
of a Canadian junior issue (US$1 million to US$10 million) is less (15.98%) than that of a U.S. 
issue (17.99%). However, the direct cost for large-cap issues (more than US$100 million) is 
similar in both countries.   11 
In the two countries, brokerage commissions constitute the largest part of total direct costs. 
They are 8.12% for issues from US$1 million to US$10 million and 5.53% for issues greater 
than US$100 million. In the United States, the average commission is 9.29% for issues from 
US$1  million  to  US$10  million  and  6.09%  for  issues  over  US$100  million.  The  initial 
undervaluation  is  more  significant  in  Canada  than  in  the  U.S.,  but  this  cannot  be  tied  to 
regulatory matters. This analysis, which confirms a number of previous studies, indicates that 
junior issuers are not penalized in Canada as a result of the regulatory framework with respect 
to  direct  costs  of  offerings.  However,  the  analysis  highlights  the  importance  of  the  initial 
undervaluation of the price of the securities issued, which is the principal component of the 
costs of offerings. A 30% undervaluation indicates that the securities were sold at a price that 
represents 70% of the future value on the secondary market. This major component of the costs 
of offerings seems to be linked to brokerage operations and the conduct of parties at the time of 
the offerings.    12 
Table 4 IPO costs according to size of issue, excluding capital pool issues, for the period 1997-
1999,  according  to  Kooli  and  Suret  (2003).  The  average  percentages  are  all  statistically 
different from zero to the 1% level. 
 
1.4.2 Cost of Capital 
Overall, based on a measurement of data for large-cap businesses, the cost of capital in Canada 
seems to be identical to the cost of capital in the United States. On the whole, Hail and Leuz 
(2006) attribute a slight advantage to the U.S. (10.2% compared with 10.5%), while Claus and 
Thomas (2001) attribute a 20 basis point advantage, but in favour of Canada. Comparisons 
between  the  two  countries,  however,  are  difficult  due  to  differences  in  their  industrial 
structures. He and Kryzanowski (2007) therefore analyze the differences in each sector and 
show that there are no significant differences in any of these sectors. Indeed, Canada has a net 
advantage of some 100 basis points in the finance and resource sectors. Very recently, Witmer 
and  Zorn  (2007)  re-examined  these  differences,
9  using various methodologies and taking 
enterprise characteristics into account. On average, they analyzed 180 Canadian businesses per 
year, of which one third were cross-listed. The financial sector was  excluded. The authors 
estimate that the cost of equity is 30 to 50 basis points higher in Canada, but this difference has 
                                                 
9 Figure 1 in the Witmer and Zorn study illustrates the diversity of findings in previous studies on this 
matter. 














Canada           
1.0 – 9.9  53  8.12%  7.86%  15.98%  30.61% 
10.0 – 49.9  49  6.14%  3.31%  9.45%  11.30% 
50.0 – 99.9  10  6%  2%  8%  10.76% 
100 and over  16  5.53%  1.75%  7.28%  8.88% 
Average    6.88%  4.9%  11.78%  18.95% 
Weighted average (by size)  5.35%  1.84%  7.19%  5.11% 
United States 
1.0 – 9.9  119  9.29%  8.7%  17.99%  9.05% 
10.0 – 49.9  532  6.93%  3.70%  10.63%  26.15% 
50.0 – 99.9  300  6.88%  2.12%  9%  55.57% 
100 and over  237  6.09%  1.2%  7.29%  67.19% 
Average    7%  3.3%  10.30%  37.5% 
Weighted average (by size)  5.79%  1.43%  7.22%  38.38%   13 
decreased since 1997, a decrease the authors attribute to changes in the relationship between 
interest rates in the two countries. Given the diversity of results, the small sample sizes studied 
and  the  findings  of  the  various  studies,  it  appears  difficult  to  state  that  there  are  major 
differences between the cost of capital for Canadian companies and U.S. companies in recent 
years. The differences reported are, in fact, minor, while measuring the cost of capital always 
involves  significant  estimation  errors,  regardless  of  the  method  used.  Moreover,  it  is  very 
difficult to make a link between differences in the cost of capital and regulatory differences. 
Table 5 sets out Hail and Leuz‘s (2006) estimates of the cost of equity. The Table indicates that 
the cost of equity in Canada is one of the lowest in the world, a figure consistent with estimates 
of the quality of regulation and disclosure. In particular, Canada is in a better position than 
either of the countries often used as a reference point by reason of their centralized regulation, 
namely, Australia and the United Kingdom.  
Table 5 Analysis of the relationship between the cost of capital and the 
quality of regulation in various countries. The reported cost of equity is the 
















United States  10.24%  1  0.97  1 
France  10.37%  0.75  0.58  0.9 
Canada  10.53%  0.92  0.91  1 
Italy  10.61%  0.67  0.46  0.83 
United Kingdom  10.64%  0.83  0.73  0.86 
Australia  10.72%  0.75  0.77  1 
Belgium  11.00%  0.42  0.34  1 
New Zealand  11.14%  0.67  0.48  1 
Austria  11.21%  0.25  0.18  1 
Israel  11.41%  0.67  0.65  0.48 
Netherlands  12.75%  0.5  0.62  1 
Finland  13.40%  0.5  0.49  1 
India  14.39%  0.92  0.75  0.42 
Hong Kong  14.58%  0.92  0.81  0.82 
Mexico  15.59%  0.58  0.35  0.54 
Brazil  20.85%  0.25  0.39  0.63 
Egypt  25.27%  0.5  0.34  0.42 
Total (average)  12.97%  0.65  0.56  0.74 
       Source: Hail and Leuz (2006)   14 
We  are  particularly  interested  in  the  cost  of  capital  for  junior  issuers.  The  rate  at  which 
businesses are financed is on average equal to the rate of return that investors expect to earn. It 
can  be  estimated,  on  average,  using  the  rate  of  return  that  investors  actually  earn.
10  It is 
generally recognized that the lack of transparency in financial statements and risk are two 
factors that have a positive impact on the cost of capital. In the case of Canadian issuers, which 
often report no income, it could therefore be expected  to be particularly high. We have 
estimated the rates realized in the three years following an offering in the case of private 
placements, initial public offerings (IPOs), follow-on offerings, capital pool companies (CPCs) 
and reverse takeovers. Table 6 sum marizes the results of these estimates, which appear as 
annual  spreads  compared  with  returns  earned  by  similar  businesses.
11  All  categories  of 
offerings are followed by abnormally negative returns. Based on these estimates, which cover 
8,575 financing operations over 20 years, it can be said that the cost of capital for Canadian 
issuers tends to be lower than that required for the market as a whole. The spread is not always 
statistically significant, but it is economically material. At a minimum, we estimate it to be 300 
basis points per year for CPCs and 348 basis points for IPOs. Such a spread can give these 
issuers  a  competitive  advantage.  The  observation  that  returns  following  an  offering  are 
abnormally low is not limited to Canada. An explanation of this development and its impact on 
investors will not be discussed here.
12  Our task was to demonstrate that general financial 
conditions available to growth companies through the stock market are highly favourable in 
Canada, whether in respect of direct or indirect financing costs.  
                                                 
10  Bhattacharya  (2006)  sets  out  the  various  approaches  used  for  measuring  the  cost  of  capital  and 
provides an overview of the links between regulation and the cost of capital. Measuring the cost of 
capital based on the return earned is not the best method, but it is the only possible method for small 
issuers, for which no data forecasts are available. 
11  The  issuers  are  usually  smaller  than  the  market  overall  and  also  have  different  growth  profiles. 
Estimated return spreads are therefore calculated based on size, market and growth, using the multifactor 
Fama-French model. CPCs are those whose qualifying transaction took place before January 1, 2004. 
These estimates are complex and, as regards IPOs, CPCs and RTOs, should be considered as an order of 
magnitude and not as definitive estimates. Details of estimates for subsequent financings are set out in 
the study by Carpentier et al. (2007). 
12 A low cost of capital obviously provides a significant advantage to issuers, because it gives them a 
comparative advantage. However, such returns indicate that investors earn very poor returns on average 
when financing these issuers. Ultimately, this situation presents the risk that investors will turn away 
from financing growth companies. However, we have observed that the lowest returns are those of 
companies that carry out offerings or issues without showing revenue. It will likely be necessary to 
inform investors about the risks and probabilities of realizing returns with such issuers.   15 
Table  6  Estimated  cost  of  capital  for  Canadian  issuers,  based  on  return  spreads  when 
compared with similar companies. 
      Return spread 36 months 
   No. obs.  Monthly  Annual  Significant 
Initial offerings (1986-2003)  1809  -0.29%  -3.48%  no 
Reverse takeovers (1986-2003)  682  -1.20%  -14.37%  yes 
Capital pool companies (1995-1999)  714  -0.25%  -3.00%  no 
Private placements (1993-2003)  3291  -0.75%  -9.00%  yes 
Subsequent offerings (1993-2003)  2079  -0.67%  -8.04%  yes 
 
1.5 GRADUATIONS AND MIGRATIONS 
Both Canadian markets are places of transition. The TSX Venture Exchange views itself as an 
incubator and considers the graduation of its issuers to the senior marketplace to be a sign of 
success. In total, since 1989, 827 companies have moved from a Canadian venture exchange to 
the TSX, representing approximately 45 companies per year (Table 7). Thus, despite lenient 
listing requirements, junior exchanges provide the opportunity for a relatively large number of 
new entrants to grow so as to satisfy the requirements of the senior exchange. Since 1986, 511 
Canadian companies have obtained listings on one of the U.S. exchanges. More than 330 of 
them listed their securities on a U.S. over-the-counter (OTC) system, according to Doidge et al. 
(2007), and some chose to list themselves on London‘s Alternative Investment Market (AIM). 
In all, 555 issuers joined the 95 issuers that were already listed on a U.S. exchange at the 
beginning  of  1986.  Canadian  companies  list  their  securities  on  a  U.S.  exchange  so  as  to 
improve their visibility and access new pools of investors in a more liquid and deeper market. 
They also do so for strategic business reasons when the market for their products or services is 
growing in the United States. A number of authors also suggest that the presence of a strong 
regulatory system in the United States draws foreign companies that are seeking a certification 
effect. Conversely, the number of foreign companies listed in Canada is low and the percentage 
of transactions carried out by them in Canada is marginal.
13  
                                                 
13 As at the end of June 2007, 17 foreign issuers, primarily US firms, were cross-listed on the TSX and 
carried out 5.6% of their total transactions in that market (source: TSX Review, June 2007).    16 
Table  7  Annual  distribution  of  company  moves  (graduations)  from  junior  exchanges  (TSX 
Venture and predecessor exchanges) to  senior exchanges  (TSE and TSX) as  well as  to  U.S. 
exchanges. Annual distribution of Canadian issuers cross-listing in the U.S. and on AIM. The 




TSXV issuers  
migrating to the  
TSX or a U.S. exchange 
Canadian issuers  
cross-listing on a U.S. 
exchange  
Canadian issuers  
cross-listing  
on AIM 
       
1986  N/A  14  - 
1987  N/A  27  - 
1988  N/A  27  - 
1989  33  16  - 
1990  24  12  - 
1991  13  8  - 
1992  28  16  - 
1993  40  23  - 
1994  57  32  - 
1995  47  30  - 
1996  56  36  - 
1997  56  28  - 
1998  47  36  1 
1999  33  29  - 
2000  44  49  - 
2001  27  24  - 
2002  29  12  3 
2003  60  17  3 
2004  75  20  11 
2005  61  28  8 
2006  72  22  12 
2007  25  5  6 
Total 95-07  632  336  44 
Total 86-07  827  511  44 
Sources: Graduations: TSX Venture and TSX Review; Cross-listing in the United States and on AIM: 
compilation  by  authors  based  on  TSX  Review  and  AIM  website.  An  analysis  of  cross-listings  is 
available in Carpentier et al. (2007c).   17 
1.6 DISPERSION OF TRANSACTIONS 
The various documents prepared for the Panel highlight the duality of the Canadian securities 
market, which is composed of a limited number of large-cap securities and a rather significant 
number of small-cap securities. Nicholls (2006, p. 152) reports that the very large enterprises 
are usually incorporated under the federal system. He illustrates that there is a larger number of 
reporting issuers in British Colombia or Alberta than in Ontario (Figure 2). An analysis of head 
office locations indicates that over 63% of head offices are not located in Toronto. Moreover, if 
the average number of employees is used as an indicator of the size of a company, Montréal, 
Toronto and Calgary are on an equal footing (Table 8).  
Table 8 Distribution of head offices in Canada and average staff, 
by province, in 2005, according to Statistics Canada. 





Montréal  536  21.51%  69 
Ottawa—Gatineau  101  4.05%  46 
Toronto  918  36.84%  64 
Winnipeg  129  5.18%  53 
Calgary  316  12.68%  61 
Edmonton  157  6.30%  22 
Vancouver  335  13.44%  36 
 Total  2492     
Sources:  D.  Beckstead  and  W.  M.  Brown  (2006).  Head  Office 
Employment in Canada, 1999 to 2005. Analytical paper No 11-624-MIE, 
Micro-economic Analysis Division, Statistics Canada 
A significant portion of the responsibilities and tasks of securities commissions is related to 
financing activities, which are very numerous in Canada. We established the location of the 
issuers involved in each of the following transactions between January 1993 and December 
2003:  initial  public  offerings  (IPOs),  the  establishment  of  capital  pool  companies  (CPCs), 
exchange listings through reverse takeovers (RTOs), private placements carried out by public 
companies (PPPCs) and subsequent public offerings (SPOs). The province of origin of an issuer 
incorporated federally was considered to be the province where its head office is located. In all, 
we identified and analyzed over 10,000 financing transactions. Table 9 shows the distribution   18 
of these transactions in the provinces in which they occur most frequently. We subdivided the 
11 years into two subperiods, to better highlight changes.
14  
Issuers  in  Alberta  and  British  Colomb ia  account  for  58.63%  of  all  financing  activities, 
regardless of type, in Canada. This percentage is stable over the two subperiods. Ontario 
accounts for 22.85% of transactions. Here, too, there is little variation over time. Québec issuers 
account for 6.68% of transactions between 1993 and 1998. This percentage rises to 10.16% 
between 1999 and 2003. The increase is seen across all categories of financing. The percentage 
of transactions carried out in the other provinces as well as by non-Canadian issuers declines.
15 
An analysis of each type of transaction indicates that Ontario companies are proportionally 
more active in subsequent issues, which is consistent with the presence of larger and more 
mature companies in that province.  
It is therefore clear that  the majority of financing transactions occur elsewhere than in the 
province  of  Ontario.  These  financing  activities  usually  involve  small  amounts,  but  they 
represent the amounts required to satisfy the funding needs of small- and medium-sized public 
companies.  These  companies  constitute  more  than  80%  of  reporting  issuers  in  Canada. 
Financing activities in Canada—like the breakdown of head offices and reporting issuers—
reflect the wide dispersion of activities governed by securities commissions in Canada. Non-
traditional exchange listing transactions (CPCs and RTOs) continue to be largely concentrated 
in the western provinces. 
                                                 
14 We did not break down the amounts, because such figures would have little meaning, given the 
existence of a few transactions involving several billions of dollars, while the amounts raised in Canada 
are generally in the vicinity of a few million dollars. 
15 The decline in transactions categorized as ―other‖ is due, on the one hand, to the decreased activities 
of non-Canadian issuers and, on the other hand, to a decrease in issues by companies located in the 
Yukon.   19 
Table 9 Distribution of financing activities in Canada between January 1993 and December 
2003,  based  on  the  issuer‘s  head  office  location.  Initial  public  offerings  (IPOs),  the 
establishment of capital pool companies (CPCs), exchange listings through reverse takeovers 
(RTOs), private placements carried out by public companies (PPPCs) and subsequent public 
offerings (SPOs) were identified using the Financial Post database, stock exchange reviews and 
various  other  databases,  and  the  numbers  reported  represent  the  population  of  identifiable 
transactions.  The  category  ―Other‖  represents  issuers  from  the  other  provinces  and  foreign 
issuers.  
  Alberta  British Columbia  Ontario  Québec  Other  Total 
  #  %  #  %  #  %  #  %  #  %  # 
Period 1: 1993-1998                 
IPOs  226  28.83  168  21.43  232  29.59  82  10.46  76  9.69  784 
CPCs  527  85.28  24  3.88  36  5.83  20  3.24  11  1.78  618 
RTOs  30  10.07  97  32.55  113  37.92  9  3.02  49  16.44  298 
PPPCs  907  28.04  997  30.82  696  21.51  157  4.85  478  14.78  3235 
SPOs  428  30.53  320  22.82  376  26.82  155  11.06  123  8.77  1402 
Total  2118  33.42  1606  25.34  1453  22.93  423  6.68  737  11.63  6337 
Period 2: 1999-2003             
IPOs  53  20.87  69  27.17  73  28.74  36  14.17  23  9.06  254 
CPCs  201  49.63  117  28.89  23  5.68  27  6.67  37  9.14  405 
RTOs  73  31.33  74  31.76  57  24.46  13  5.58  16  6.87  233 
PPPCs  503  37.07  373  27.49  238  17.54  110  8.11  133  9.80  1357 
SPOs  427  29.25  276  18.90  452  30.96  191  13.08  114  7.81  1460 
Total  1257  33.89  909  24.51  843  22.73  377  10.16  323  8.71  3709 
All observations combined, 1993-2003           
IPOs  279  26.88  237  22.83  305  29.38  118  11.37  99  9.54  1038 
CPCs  728  71.16  141  13.78  59  5.77  47  4.59  48  4.69  1023 
RTOs  103  19.40  171  32.20  170  32.02  22  4.14  65  12.24  531 
PPPCs  1410  30.71  1370  29.83  934  20.34  267  5.81  611  13.31  4592 
SPOs  855  29.87  596  20.82  828  28.93  346  12.09  237  8.28  2862 
Total  3375  33.60  2515  25.03  2296  22.85  800  7.96  1060  10.55  10046 
 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
A number of documents  prepared in  connection with  the discussion of Canada‘s securities 
regulatory system describe a market heavily penalized by an inadequate, inefficient and costly 
regulatory structure. The elements we have highlighted, based on a review of all company 
financings, disappearances and migrations in Canada over a period of 20 years, provide a more 
positive picture. The Canadian markets seem to have developed strategies that are well suited to 
the  characteristics  of  an  economy  heavily  dependent  on  small-cap  companies  and  on  the 
resource sector. Issuers are able to obtain financing and refinancing on favourable conditions at 
an early stage in their development. Their survival rate is higher than in the other markets, and   20 
migrations to senior markets are numerous. The direct costs of financing are low and the rates 
demanded by investors, estimated on the basis of the rates earned, are also very favourable to 
issuers. The pace of financing transactions is very brisk. The majority of transactions involve 
amounts that do not exceed one or two million dollars, and these transactions are most often 
carried out locally. A great majority of financing transactions, regardless of type, takes place 
outside Ontario, and the Canadian market seems considerably dispersed. 
It is certainly possible to improve the functioning of the Canadian system, particularly in order 
to  retain  issuers  that  migrate  to  foreign  markets  and  in  order  to  attract  issuers  from  other 
countries. However, we believe it is essential to maintain and eventually improve the financing 
conditions  for  local  businesses.  Our  analysis  of  the  Panel‘s  proposals  and  arguments  will 
therefore be conducted with the foregoing in mind.  
2 THE PANEL’S PROPOSALS  
2.1 REGULATION BASED ON PRINCIPLES AND THE AIM EXAMPLE 
The Panel  suggests that principles-based regulation would be more efficient  and  attractive, 
improve  Canada‘s  competitiveness  and  thereby  allow  Canada  to  compete  with  the  United 
States. Moreover, this type of regulation should be applied uniformly and therefore requires a 
single securities regulator. In this regard, the Panel states that it has relied on academic studies 
carried out under the auspices of the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation (p. 12). 
Below, we will address the following questions:  
(1) How is a principles-based system different from a rules-based system? 
(2) Does a principles-based system provide securities exchanges with a decisive advantage? 
(3) Can such a system be applied in Canada and what would its potential impact be? 
2.1.1 Principles-Based Regulation  
Principles-based regulation promises to replace detailed sets of rules that prohibit, restrict or 
authorize  conduct  with  one  or  more  general  principles.  The  United  Kingdom‘s  Financial 
Services Authority uses such a regulatory approach. It also applies a vast set of rules, as pointed   21 
out  by  its  president.
16  The  Alternative  Investment  Market  (AIM)  represents  the  most 
spectacular application of this approach, having replaced minimum listing standards with the 
principle that the admission of a new issuer should not be detrimental to the reputation of the 
exchange. A business seeking to be admitted on AIM must find a Nominated Advisor (Nomad) 
who certifies that the issuer has the required qualities to be listed on the exchange.
17 
2.1.2 Does a Principles-Based System Provide Securities Exchanges with a Decisive 
Advantage? 
AIM is considered to be a success: It was created in 1995 and, based on the information on its 
website, it has attracted 2,700 companies. These include a large number of foreign companies 
that  have  cross-listed  on  AIM  or  carried  out  their  initial  offering  on  AIM.  However,  the 
increase in the number of foreign companies cross-listed on AIM is recent: There were 55 of 
them in 2002 and 242 in 2006. As Rousseau points out (p. 88), this increase is largely based on 
economic conditions, and owes much to European interest in the natural resource sector, which 
has grown very rapidly since 2001. 
The growth of this market has attracted the attention of various countries, including the United 
States. The decrease in the relative share of initial offerings resulting from a shift to AIM, as 
well as to the Asian markets, has raised serious concerns, as clearly illustrated in the report 
commissioned  by  the  mayor  of  New  York  and  Senator  Schumer  (McKinsey  &  Company, 
2006). The report notes a decline of 4% to 7% in New York‘s relative share of financings and 
the loss of a significant number of jobs in the financial sector, and attributes this situation to 
regulatory causes, among others. This report, as well as the study carried out by Goldman 
Sachs (2007) and the work of Doidge et al. (2007), shows that a number of factors, other than 
the  regulatory  system,  explain  the  success  of  the  London  marketplace.  The  growth  of  the 
European  and  Asian  markets  is  the  first  factor.  In  many  countries,  market  capitalization 
represented a much lower portion of the gross national product than in North America. This gap 
is  being  closed  and  financing  activities  are  refocusing  on  Europe  and  Asia.  London  has  a 
significant time zone advantage, providing an overlap of trading hours both with Asia and with 
                                                 
16 See: Callum McCarthy, Financial Regulation: Myth and Reality, British American Business London 
Insight Series and Financial Services Forum (Feb. 13, 2007), available at: 
 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/0213_cm.shtml 
17 Rousseau analyzed the functioning of this exchange and the appropriateness of this type of regulation 
in the Canadian context (2006); therefore, we will not replicate this discussion here.   22 
the Americas, whereas the markets open on the U.S. East Coast only after the close of all other 
markets.  London  is  integrated  in  the  European  Union,  even  though  it  has  not  adopted  its 
currency.  Finally, the  growth of hedge  funds,  mutual  funds  and pension plans is,  and  will 
continue to be, more rapid outside than inside North America. The same is true of economic 
growth,  particularly  in  India,  China  and  Russia.  According  to  McKinsey  &  Company,  the 
availability of human resources is also a key component of financial market competitiveness. 
Finally, Doidge et al. show that changes in listing choices are largely reflective of changes in 
the nature of issuers. Companies that obtained listings on AIM would generally not have been 
able to list themselves on the large U.S. exchanges. The foregoing explain the following finding 
by Goldman Sachs (p. 2): ―Legal and regulatory factors probably do matter, and policy reform 
might strengthen New York‘s competitiveness. Nonetheless, we do not see them as the critical 
drivers behind the shift in financial market intermediation, even in the aggregate. Quite simply, 
economic and geographic factors matter more.‖ 
These arguments do not mean that regulatory factors have no impact. Indeed, the interviews 
conducted by McKinsey & Company indicate that the existence of an integrated regulator, like 
the  Financial  Services  Authority,  is  an  important  element  for  financial  sector  participants. 
However, the significance of factors other than regulatory indicates that it is probably illusory 
to think of competing with AIM by merely adopting a principles-based system. That this is 
particularly true is shown by the studies carried out for the purpose of explaining the growth of 
AIM; by analyzing cross-listing premiums, these studies highlight that a strict regulatory and 
governance structure can provide certain advantages.  
Companies that cross-list in the United States benefit from a cross-listing premium (CLP): 
Their value is higher than the value of similar companies that are not cross-listed. This premium 
exists for companies from all countries, and is not specific to Canada. Indeed, in Canada, the 
premium  seems  to  disappear  after  a  few  years  (King  and  Segal,  2005).  It  is  therefore 
exaggerated  to  view  the  CLP  as  a  consequence  of  Canadian  regulatory  deficiencies,  as 
suggested by Coffee (2007).
18 On average, the CLP is estimated at between 17% and 22% 
(according to estimation methods) for a listing on a U.S. exchange (Doidge  et al., p. 31). It 
results from the fact that a company that is listed in the United States subjects itself to a more 
                                                 
18 See ―Canada’s position in a Globalizing World of Securities Markets: an Outsider’s perspective,” 
presentation by J.C. Coffee, Meech Lake, June 19, 2007.   23 
stringent regulatory environment as well as to greater scrutiny by the authorities, analysts and 
institutional investors (Doidge et al., 2007, p. 3). This environment improves the governance 
system. The premium can also be linked to better possibilities for financing growth. Doidge et 
al.  show  that  the  premium  has  persisted  for  U.S.  listings,  even  after  the  adoption  of  the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). However, they observe a discount, rather than a premium, when 
foreign  companies  cross-list  on  an  exchange  in  the  United  Kingdom.  In  practical  terms,  a 
foreign company that cross-lists in the United States sees an increase of 17% to 22% in value, 
while a company that opts to cross-list on AIM sees its value diminish by 5%. The authors 
conclude that due to the regulatory system in place, a listing on a U.S. exchange provides 
specific advantages that the London markets cannot offer.  
Therefore, the implementation of a principles-based system has the advantage of allowing a 
greater number of companies to list themselves, but may also have negative consequences.
19 
Indeed, the level of AIM requirements has raised concerns, and requirements relating to certain 
offerings have been re-examined.
20 The past experience of European venture exchanges during 
periods of economic reversal urges caution. The lack of very significant advantages of an AIM 
listing probably explains why there are still only a limited number of Canadian companies listed 
on AIM. 
2.1.3 AIM and Canada 
As Table 10 shows, although 44 Canadian companies have listed on AIM since 1995,
21 336 of 
them listed in the United States during the same period. The attraction for AIM is therefore 
relative, and Canadian companies opt on a ra tio of eight to one for a traditionally regulated 
market. The limited number of Canadian issuers listed on AIM is even more curious, given the 
existence of an accelerated listing process for firms already listed on the TSX. This situation 
does not indicate a strong preference for a principles -based system, contrary to the Panel‘s 
assertion.  
                                                 
19  For  a  discussion  of  the  advantages  and  problems  of  the  two  regulatory  approaches,  see  ―SEC 
Regulation Outside the United States,” Commissioner R. C. Campos, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, London, March 8, 2007, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030807rcc.htm 
20  Jeremy  Warner,  ―OUTLOOK:  Taking  AIM.‖  The  Independent,  London  (April  9,  2005);  James 
Mackintosh ―FSA to act on foreign IPO concerns,‖ Financial Times and FT.com (April 5, 2007).  
21 Among them, 4 were already listed on a US exchange.   24 
An analysis of the attributes of issues that have taken place on AIM provides an indication of 
the implicit standards resulting from the application of the principles by Nomads. Derrien and 
Kecskes  (2007)  report  figures,  summarized  in  Table  10,  for  786  IPOs  completed  on  AIM 
between 1995 and 2004. We have estimated corresponding values for Canadian IPOs for the 
same period.
22 We base our comparisons on medians and on the first quartile (25% of issuers 
have a value below the value reported), given that averages have little meaning in such a 
context. The median post-issue capitalization is $31.66 million on AIM and $12.64 million on 
all Canadian exchanges. While 75% of issuers on AIM have a market value that exceeds $14.22 
million, 50% of Canadian issuers have a market capitalization of less than $12.64 million. A 
comparison of revenues also highlights significant differences: Half of Canadian iss uers have 
revenues of less than $286,000, while 75% of issuers on AIM have revenues above $325,000.  
The vast majority of Canadian issuers would likely not have been able to list on a securities 
exchange  if  a  system  similar  to  AIM  had  existed.  Canadian  financing  requirements  for 
growth companies therefore appear much more flexible than the principles-based system on 
which AIM relies, in particular because of the parallel CPC and RTO mechanisms, as Rousseau 
notes (2006, p. 102). Although certain AIM issuers report losses, the majority of them earn 
revenue, and their market capitalization is significant by comparison with that of Canadian 
issuers. Transplanting the system to Canada would result in a significant tightening of exchange 
listing requirements. It might also increase the costs to access the market, given that direct costs 
on AIM are estimated at between 10.5% and 12% for an issue of $20 million, compared with 
9.45% in Canada (Table 4). Moreover, Rousseau expresses much doubt on the possibility of 
implementing the Nomad system in Canada—an integral part of the principles-based system of 
AIM—and indicates that such a system could result in raising the already high concentration 
that exists in the Canadian brokerage industry.  
                                                 
22 The authors report their figures in pounds. We used an exchange rate of 2.286 Canadian dollars per 
pound, namely, the average rate that prevailed during the period in question.    25 
Table 10 Comparison of attributes of IPOs followed by listings on AIM and 
on Canadian stock exchanges, in millions of Canadian dollars  
 
  AIM,  
786 IPOs between June 
1995 and July 2004 
Canada (TSX and 
TSXV),  
678 IPOs between 
January 1995 and 
December 2003  
Capitalization     
  Average  61.70  114.49 
  Median  31.66  12.64 
  1st quartile  14.22  3.68 
Sales     
  Average  15.9  65.20 
  Median  3.34  0.286 
  1st quartile  0.325  0.00 
Net income     
  Average  -1.49  1.285 
  Median  -0.297  -0.062 
  1st quartile  -2.30  -0.452 
   Source AIM: Derrien and Kecskes (2007)  
Transplanting  the  AIM  system  to  Canada  would  therefore  prevent  a  significant  portion  of 
Canadian issuers from accessing the market. We must therefore agree with Rousseau‘s first 
proposal, which reads as follows (p. 84): ―Canadian stock exchanges and regulators should 
abstain  from  transplanting  the  Nomad  system,  and  related  features,  of  the  AIM  model  in 
Canada.‖ 
2.2 THE CANADIAN MARKET AND JUNIOR ISSUERS 
2.2.1 Current Situation 
In part 1 of this paper, we showed quite clearly that Canadian issuers benefit from favourable 
financing conditions, whether financing opportunities or terms, as regards direct and indirect 
costs. In particular, financings which, in other countries, would involve venture capital firms 
providing financing at rates in excess of 25%, are carried out in Canada at a rate apparently 
lower than the rate generally sought in the securities market. The Panel states that moving to a 
single regulator system would clearly reduce the costs of capital for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), reduce the costs related to offerings and provide greater access to Canadian   26 
investors. The Panel relies heavily on a study carried out by the Canadian Bankers Association 
(the ―CBA Study‖), which indicates that additional costs must be borne when issuers seek to 
raise capital through IPOs in several provinces. The CBA Study states that (1) the majority of 
IPOs are carried out in several provinces and (2) offerings in several provinces give rise to 
significant additional costs. We will address each of the three benefits which, according to the 
Panel, would result from the implementation of a single regulator. 
2.2.2 Reduced Cost of Capital 
We  have  shown  that  the  cost  of  capital  for  Canadian  issuers,  predominantly  SMEs,  is 
abnormally low. It would therefore seem difficult to reduce it even more. Moreover, reducing 
this cost would further lower the rate of return earned by Canadian investors, likely causing 
them to stop participating in the offerings market. Rather than focusing on further reducing the 
financing  costs  borne  by  issuers,  committees  and  organizations  studying  the  matter  should 
focus more on the reasons behind the situation and on the means for providing investors with 
sufficient information and training so that, on average, they can earn returns consistent with the 
degree  of  risk  they  have  assumed.  This  is  an  essential  condition  for  ensuring  that  issuers 
continue to have access to favourable financing terms. Over the long term, a financial market 
will grow only if issuers provide investors with returns consistent with the level of risk they 
have assumed. We do not believe that reducing the cost of capital for SMEs in Canada is an 
absolute priority, because there is no indication that it is abnormally high. Indeed, the prevailing 
situation seems to be one that favours issuers to the detriment of investors. 
Moreover, the conditions for reducing the cost of capital are relatively well-known. The first 
condition,  an  all-encompassing  one,  relates  to  the  quality  of  the  regulatory  and  disclosure 
system. We have shown (Table 5) that the level of quality in Canada is deemed equivalent to 
that in the United States and better than that in the United Kingdom and Australia. Beyond 
domestic factors, the cost of equity is company-dependent and varies based on the degree of 
risk and uncertainty involved. Uncertainty results from lack of information transparency and the 
difficulty in evaluating certain classes of issuers.
23 An initial means of reducing the  cost of 
capital for SMEs would therefore be to limit exchange listings by companies that carry the 
                                                 
23 The cost of equity is related (inversely) to the level of disclosure (Botosan, 1997) and is also affected 
by the liquidity of securities (Amihud and Mendelson, 2000).   27 
highest degree of risk and are the most difficult to assess accurately, namely, issuers without 
revenue, which comprise 45% of IPO issuers, and those that obtain an exchange listing through 
an RTO or CPC. Theory and empirical studies suggest quite strongly that the cost of capital 
varies inversely with regulatory stringency. It is therefore paradoxical to state that relaxing the 
regulatory  system,  or  implementing  differentiated  requirements,  would  reduce  the  cost  of 
capital. The likely impact would be the opposite of what is intended.  
2.2.3 Access to Canadian Investors  
According to the CBA Study, IPO issuers often approach investors in several provinces. A total 
of 299 offerings were analyzed.
24 The study ignores the 290 CPCs that were created during the 
same period and were limited to a single province. Based on this sampling, the CBA argues that 
issuers raise capital in several provinces and, as a result, incur additional costs. No information 
is provided on the percentage or characteristics of multijurisdictional issuers. It is therefore 
impossible to measure the extent of any potential problem. 
We  estimate  that  the  majority  of  offerings  and  exchange  listing s  in  Canada  are  local 
transactions that involve only one securities commission. This is the case for the vast majority 
of  RTOs,  CPCs  and  offerings  involving  gross  proceeds  of  less  than  $2  million.  These 
transactions represent approximately 3,900 of the 4,900 offerings we identified, namely, about 
80% of offerings. Larger offerings frequently take place simultaneously in several provinces. 
Therefore, the additional costs attributable to simultaneous offerings in several jurisdictions are 
economically negligible.  
2.2.4 Direct Costs 
If we compare offerings of the same size, the direct costs of issue in Canada are lower than 
those in the United States as well as those on AIM in the United Kingdom. It is therefore 
difficult to argue that creating a single regulator such as in these two countries, or implementing 
a principles-based regulatory system such as the one in the United Kingdom, would generate a 
significant reduction in costs. Moreover, we only measured IPO costs. In principle, the costs of 
an exchange listing by way of RTO or CPC should be even lower. We also measured the direct 
and indirect costs of private placements and subsequent offerings (Carpentier et al., 2005). We 
                                                 
24 It is difficult to determine if the study is limited to initial offerings or if it covers subsequent offerings.    28 
found that the total cost for private placements stood at 13.30%, including the discount. This 
total value is considerably less than the discount measured in the United States, which alone 
amounts to 20%. We found the total cost for subsequent offerings to be 7.55%, an amount that 
is also lower than amounts identified in U.S. studies. For example, Lee et al. (1996) report 
direct costs of 13.28% for subsequent offerings of less than US$10 million. Regardless of the 
type offering, the direct costs are lower than in the United States. It is obviously desirable to 
reduce them further. 
Using an example that examines 7 offerings, the CBA‘s analysis indicates additional costs of 
$30,000 for offerings of $6 million, when the offering takes place in several provinces. This 
merits a number of comments. Firstly, the spread represents 0.5% of the gross proceeds of the 
offering. Secondly, in order for the spread to be significant, it should be estimated over a very 
large sample and take into account the other factors that affect the costs of issue: first and 
foremost the size of the offering. Finally, the principal cost borne by IPO issuers is the initial 
undervaluation, which deprives small issuers (less than $10 million) of approximately 30% of 
the proceeds of their offering. Any serious effort to reduce the costs of issue should focus more 
on reducing this major component, which is linked to brokerage operations. 
The situation is different for offerings of $10 million and more, which seem to constitute the 
bulk  of  the  CBA  Study‘s  sample.  However,  for  these  offerings,  the  cost  spread  has  little 
economic significance and its analysis requires that the effects of offering size be considered 
separately from the effects attributed to multiple jurisdictions.  
2.2.5 Conclusion 
The Panel proposes to reduce the cost of capital for Canadian SMEs. This cost is already very 
low, and it would be possible to reduce it only by limiting access by the highest risk issuers or 
by  increasing  the  level  of  disclosure.  The  Panel  then  argues  that  the  existence  of  multiple 
jurisdictions results in additional direct costs of offerings. However, the evidence relating to 
these  costs  is  quite  sparse,  and  our  estimates  indicate  that  the  vast  majority  of  financing 
transactions are carried out locally. In fact, they involve amounts below $2 million. Therefore, 
there does not seem to be a major problem as regards the cost of financing of growth companies 
through the securities market. It is equally difficult to see how the creation of a single regulator 
and the implementation of a principles-based regulatory system would improve the situation.   29 
Moreover, in a market in which 45% of issuers list their securities on an exchange before 
reporting  any  revenue,  providing  greater  financing  flexibility  for  such  companies  does  not 
appear to be an essential need. 
2.3 THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE CANADIAN MARKET 
Competition  between  markets  has  increased  significantly  in  recent  years,  reflecting  the 
significant concentration of exchanges. According to Coffee (2002), the number of exchanges 
throughout the world should continue to decrease considerably, due to globalization as well as 
technological advances.  DiNoia (2001) even foresees consolidation toward a single market, 
except where working arrangements allow for the creation of cooperative networks. The key 
component of competition between markets is the ability to attract foreign issuers, generally by 
way of cross-listings. In this regard, the U.S. and U.K. markets, each of which have different 
regulatory approaches, are the indisputable winners. The Panel suggests that only the creation 
of a single regulatory body would allow Canada to become a world-class financial centre able 
to compete with the United States and the United Kingdom. The report, as well as Coffee‘s 
statements in 2007, specifically mention the higher cost of capital that exists in Canada. Below, 
we will address the following questions. 
(1) What is Canada‘s competitive position?  
(2) What are the key elements of competition between markets? 
(3) Are Canadian companies driven to list on other markets as a result of regulatory issues? 
(4) What regulation and strategies are offered in Canada? 
2.3.1 Canada’s Competitive Position 
The position of securities  markets  has  declined significantly, beginning in  the early 1990s. 
Canada‘s global ranking fell from sixth to ninth in 2004 as regards the volume of trades. Net 
growth in trading volume (excluding the effect of variation in the index) was 8.84%. This is the 
lowest rate of growth observed in the developed countries, excluding Japan. The primary cause 
of the decrease in the relative importance of trading volume in Canada is the transfer, to the 
United States, of a significant volume of trades in securities of Canadian companies. In 2006, 
this volume reached $816 billion, representing 94% of the trading volume in Canada of cross-  30 
listed securities.
25 The percentage of trades of cross-listed Canadian securities that account for 
more than 50% of trades in the United States rose from 28% in 1990 to 55% in 2006. The many 
studies examining competition between exchanges have highlighted the major role of certain 
elements, which we discuss in the following part. 
2.3.2 What Are the Key Elements of Competition Between Markets? 
Karolyi (2006) discusses the principal elements that explain a company‘s decision to list its 
securities  on  a  foreign  exchange.  These  elements  are:  bonding  (becoming  subject  to  more 
stringent regulatory requirements), gaining access to a larger pool of investors and reducing the 
cost  of  capital  (market  segmentation  argument),  reducing  transaction  costs  and  increasing 
liquidity and, finally, drawing markets closer to products and services. Overall, the ―gravity‖ 
model is the model that best explains the cross-border movement of capital.  
The segmentation argument: Segmentation exists when two markets are not fully integrated, 
namely, when there are barriers to capital flows between the two countries. In such a case, by 
listing on a foreign exchange, a company reduces its risk through diversification that cannot 
otherwise be achieved due to the market barriers. Moreover, by listing on this market, the 
company gains access to a pool of new investors. It should be able to finance its growth more 
easily and see a stronger demand for its shares. Despite significant integration between the 
Canadian and U.S. markets, the opinion that there is a major reduction in cost of capital for 
Canadian issuers listed in the United States has largely prevailed. We therefore re-examined 
these assertions. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the pool of private and institutional investors 
in the United States and in the United Kingdom is considerably larger than in Canada, such that 
Canada is at a considerable disadvantage in that respect. 
Liquidity and trading costs: According to Domowitz et al. (2001), in general, execution costs 
are lower and liquidity is higher in the United States than in other countries. They show (Table 
1) that total one-way trading costs are 52.4 basis points in Canada compared with 38.1 in the 
United States. Based on these estimates, a portfolio with a quarterly turnover incurs additional 
annual trading costs of 85.8 basis points if the trades are carried out in Canada rather than in the 
United States. The Canadian disadvantage is therefore significant. 
                                                 
25 A detailed analysis of changes in trading of Canadian shares traded in the United States is available in 
Carpentier et al. (2007b).   31 
Bonding hypothesis: Businesses from countries with weak minority shareholder protection, in 
particular, can indicate their willingness to better protect those rights by listing  on markets 
where the protection is stronger. According to Coffee, (2002, p. 11) ―cross-listing may also be a 
bonding  mechanism  by  which  firms  incorporated  in  a  jurisdiction  with  weak  protection  of 
minority rights or poor enforcement mechanisms can voluntarily subject themselves to higher 
disclosure standards and stricter enforcement in order to attract investors who would otherwise 
be  reluctant  to  invest  (or  who  would  discount  such  stocks  to  reflect  the  risk  of  minority 
expropriation).‖ Furthermore, listing in the United States increases monitoring by analysts and 
institutional investors. In this regard, Canada is not at a major disadvantage, given the similarity 
in the securities regulatory systems. 
Strategic component: Companies list on markets where they develop their business activities so 
as to create strategic advantages and facilitate mergers and acquisitions. Bancel and Mittoo 
(2001) state that business considerations have become the principal factor driving Canadian 
companies  to  list  in  the  United  States.  In  this  regard,  too,  the  Canadian  disadvantage  is 
incontestable.  The  relative  size  of  the  two  economies  will  generally  require  a  Canadian 
company to develop in the United States in order to achieve global recognition; the converse is 
not true.  
These various elements probably explain why the gravity model is the model that best explains 
the international flow of capital (Portes and Rey, 2005). The movement of capital is essentially 
driven by the various components for measuring the relative size of economies (GNP, market 
capitalization and wealth) and is limited by certain frictions, primarily those resulting from the 
distance between countries. These variables explain 83% of the differences observed between 
international  capital  flows.  Within  the  scope  of  this  model,  the  Canada-United  States 
relationship is characterized by maximum size differences and minimal distances. Canada‘s 
relative loss of importance therefore seems inevitable.  
It is therefore inaccurate to suggest that the regulatory structure is a key component of the 
market‘s  loss  of  competitiveness.  This  loss  of  competitiveness  manifests  itself,  first  and 
foremost,  by  the  migration  of  businesses  and  transactions  toward  the  United  States,  a 
phenomenon  explained  primarily  by  strategic  and  transaction  cost  considerations.  In  the   32 
following section, we analyze the argument whereby this migration is caused by an advantage 
resulting from the regulatory system. 
2.3.3 Listing in the United States and Its Effects 
Certain studies show that the performance of Canadian companies listing in the United States is 
abnormally  low  following  such  listing.  For  example,  Mittoo  (2003)  estimates  such 
underperformance to be 13% during the post-1990 period. By equating these realized rates of 
return with rates expected by investors, several authors associate this effect with a reduction in 
the cost of capital (Errunza and Miller, 2000). Thus, issuers benefit from listing in the United 
States, given that their financing costs diminish following a cross-listing. This argument is 
similar  to  the  premium  argument,
26  mentioned by Coffee (2007), who sees three possible 
origins:  ―weak  enforcement,  suboptimal  corporate  governance  and  costly  and  inflexible 
regulation.‖ In summary, the weak performance of Canadian companies following a U.S. listing 
is evidence of deficiencies in the Canadian regulatory system. These findings and statements 
required further examination. We analyzed all Canadian companies that listed their securities 
on a U.S. exchange since 1990, using various methods for estimating abnormal performance 
(Carpentier  et  al.,  2007c).  The  principal  finding  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1:  Performance 
following a U.S. listing is perfectly normal. Pre-listing performance is very high, evidencing 
two elements: Companies that cross-list their securities are generally good performers, and their 
shareholders see a number of advantages in the decision to cross-list. However, our findings 
contradict the argument whereby a U.S. listing reduces the cost of capital.  
                                                 
26 The value of a share is equal to the present value of future cash flows. If the discount rate (the cost of 
capital) decreases, the value increases and a premium appears.    33 
Figure 1 Cumulative abnormal returns by Canadian companies cross-listing their securities 
in the United States. We estimate abnormal returns for the year preceding the cross-listing 
(month 0) and the three years following the cross-listing. The complete sample includes 
336 cross-listings that took place between January 1990 and December 2005. Abnormal 
returns are estimated using 2 comparison indices: the S&P/TSX Capped Index (TSXC) and 
reference  portfolios  with  a  similar  size  and  ratio  of  shareholders‘  equity  to  market 
capitalization (ref. portfolio). 
 
2.3.4 The Role of Regulation and Possible Strategies 
The  position  of  the  Canadian  securities  market  is  deteriorating  as  a  result  of  the  shift  of 
transactions to U.S. exchanges. Canada attracts few foreign companies, and the percentage of 
transactions carried out in Canada is low (approximately 5%). Can regulatory changes alter this 
situation?  
Regulatory and tax factors very likely play a part in limiting foreign investment activities in 
Canada.  According  to  the  Conference  Board  (2007),  there  is  limited  foreign  investment  in 
Canada because ―Canada‘s effective tax rate on capital is the highest in the developed world; 
we  are  also  the  most  restrictive  among  the  G7  countries  in  terms  of  barriers  to  foreign 
ownership.‖  These  factors  are  not  related  to  securities,  but  their  effect  can  be  significant. 
Securities regulation also plays a role, but it would probably be excessive to attribute to the 
securities regulatory system primary responsibility for the situation. Similarly, the creation of a 
single regulator would likely have a marginal effect on the Canadian market‘s ability to hold on 
to local transactions or attract foreign issuers. Indeed, competition between securities exchanges 
is  essentially  played  out  at  the  cross-listing  level.  Cross-listing  primarily  involves  large 
companies,  which  are  generally  the  best  performers  and  the  most  focused  on  growth.  The 
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pools of investors where transaction costs are low and liquidity is high. Moreover, companies 
that  cross-list  their  securities  do  so  first  and  foremost  in  markets  that  have  geographic, 
economic, industrial and cultural proximity (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004). Therefore, it is not 
clear  how  changing  the  regulatory  structure  would  influence  the  decisions  made  by  these 
issuers. Their local obligations primarily pertain to securities exchanges, and a single regulator 
would therefore have a limited effect on the costs and constraints imposed upon such issuers. In 
recent years, competition between securities exchanges seems to have focused on new listings. 
The  market  for  foreign  IPO  issuers,  however,  is  limited,  and  its  recent  growth  is  likely 
attributable to the desire for certain small U.S. companies to avoid the application of SOX as of 
2007.  Two  options  are  therefore  suggested  in  Canada.  The  first  consists  in  developing 
regulatory requirements that are more stringent than those in the United States and would attract 
issuers seeking to cross-list their securities in order to achieve a bonding effect. In light of the 
nature of Canadian issuers, this seems unrealistic. The second option, favoured by the Panel, 
consists of adopting a strategy that imitates AIM. In the preceding section, we showed that 
transplanting  the  AIM  model  to  Canada  would  be  difficult  and  would  probably  prevent  a 
significant portion of Canadian issuers from accessing the market. 
While we do not deny that there is room for improvement in the Canadian securities regulatory 
system,  we  refute  the  idea  that  the  system  is  the  principal  obstacle  to  the  development  of 
Canadian exchanges. Moreover, given the unavoidable existence of economic and geographic 
factors that influence competition between markets, as well as the uniqueness of the Canadian 
market,  we  believe  efforts  should  be  focused,  above  all,  on  improving  and  sustaining  the 
financing options available to Canadian issuers.  
2.4 ENFORCEMENT  
The Crawford Report emphasizes the need to improve enforcement, so as to reduce the cost of 
capital for Canadian companies. ‖There is little doubt in our minds that ensuring the credibility 
of securities regulation  in Canada through vigorous enforcement will reduce this  premium, 
attract risk averse investors to our markets, and thereby increase liquidity and correspondingly 
reduce  the  cost  of  capital  to  Canadian  issuers‖  (The  Task  Force  to  Modernize  Securities 
Legislation in Canada, 2006, p. 107). We have shown, through our own studies and by referring 
to studies carried out by other researchers, that there is no significant difference between the   35 
cost of equity in the United States and in Canada. Enforcement problems are not such that 
they influence the cost of corporate financing. 
However, there is a strong feeling that economic crime, in the broadest sense, is not being 
sufficiently deterred in Canada. According to the Panel, this impression is largely attributable to 
the visibility of U.S. enforcement measures: ―Securities law enforcement in the United States 
has been highly visible on both sides of the border due to press coverage, due to the size and 
impact of the market abuses in question, and due perhaps to the search for profile by some 
involved. (...) The high visibility of securities law enforcement action in the United States has 
led many Canadian investors (justifiably or not) to conclude that Canadian regulators are failing 
in this area. There has been great concern expressed in the Canadian press with respect to what 
is perceived as the tepid reaction of Canadian securities regulators to the vigorous American 
reaction in cases of alleged securities law violations involving cross-border listed Canadian 
companies‖ (Report of the Task Force, p. 112). 
According to the Panel, a single regulator would allow for effective and fair enforcement across 
the country. The Panel also points to dissatisfaction with the current system. More specifically, 
one of the studies commissioned by the Panel points to the following elements as evidence of 
Canada‘s failure with respect to enforcement: the lack of legal proceedings and convictions in 
too many high profile cases,
27 the failure to prosecute insider trading, excessively long delays 
and inadequate penalties  (de C. Cory and Pilkington, 2006) . Comparisons with the Unite d 
States  are  frequent,  particularly  as  regards  proceedings  instituted  following  the  financial 
scandals that occurred in the late 1990s.  
2.4.1 Different Strategies  
The strategy adopted by the SEC is characterized as revolutionary (Ford, 2005). According to 
this  author,  the  strategy  is  based  on  levying  huge  penalties  against  companies  and  other 
regulated  entities.
 
The  SEC  has  also  implemented  mechanisms  (The  Framework  for 
                                                 
27 The National Pensioners and Senior Citizens Federation particularly deplores the fact that in the cases 
involving  Nortel  Networks  Corp.,  Royal  Group  Technologies  Ltd.,  Portus  Alternative  Asset 
Management Inc., Norbourg Asset Management Inc. and Norshield Asset Management Ltd., the RCMP 
(via the IMETs) did not lay any charges. See ―Canadian seniors group calls for enforcement reform,‖ 
D. Clarke, Investment News, March 12, 2007 
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070312/FREE/70308027/-
1/INIssueAlert04&ht=   36 
Cooperation) that allow companies to reduce the penalties levied against them in exchange for 
their cooperation or remedial measures. Penalties are widely reported and, according to Ford, 
these  various  actions  create  a  culture  of  compliance.  Finally,  the  U.S.  system  relies  quite 
heavily  on  private  lawsuits,  including  in  matters  of  insider  trading.  When  enforcement  of 
securities laws depends on regulators, it is said to be public. When laws and regulations relating 
to disclosure facilitate legal proceedings by individuals, enforcement is said to be private. La 
Porta et al. (2006) studied the relationship between the growth of the markets and the public 
and private dimensions of enforcement, and conclude as follows: ―We examine the effect of 
securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public 
enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and 
facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.‖  
In  Table  11,  borrowed  from  Jackson  (2006),  we  illustrate  legal  proceedings  and  penalties 
imposed in the United States, on an average annual basis, between 2002 and 2004. The Table 
illustrates the relatively marginal role played by the SEC with respect to legal proceedings: It 
initiates 9.7% of proceedings and its actions give rise to 24% of the total penalties imposed. The 
Table also illustrates the very important role of private lawsuits, which represent 44.6% of the 
cases and nearly 40% of the amounts imposed on the entities sued. In the United States, class 
actions account for 38% of the penalties imposed for financial misconduct. 
For  a  variety  of  reasons,  the  experts  consulted,  as  well  as  those  who  sat  on  the  various 
committees that studied enforcement, do not recommend that the U.S. example be followed, 
particularly as regards the publicity surrounding major penalties and as regards private lawsuits 
which, in Canada, are more limited and difficult than in the United States.
28 Thus, comparisons 
between Canada and the United States are still difficult, as Jackson points out (2006). 
However,  Table  11  shows  that  securities  commissions  are  not  the  primary  enforcers  of 
legislation. It therefore seems unlikely that a significant change in enforcement in Canada can  
be effected by modifying the structure of these commissions. This is particularly true given that 
certain measures to fight economic crime were introduced rather belatedly in Canada and still 
do not seem to be functioning properly. 
                                                 
28 For an analysis of the differences between US and Canadian class actions involving securities, see 
Ward  Branch,  of  Branch  MacMaster:  Securities  Class  Actions  in  Canada:  Haven  or  Hinterland 
http://www.branmac.com/go/download/securities.pdf.   37 
Table 11 Summary of enforcement of securities laws in the United States, for the years 2002-
2005, expressed as an annual average.  
Section A: Number of proceedings       
 
  Number of 




Public proceedings        
 SEC  639  9.70%  17.60% 
 Department of Justice (DOJ)  112  1.70%  3.10% 
 State agencies (estimate)   1,482  22.60%  40.80% 
 Subtotal  2,233  34.10%  61.50% 
 NASD  1,170  17.90%  32.20% 
 NYSE  227  3.50%  6.30% 
 Subtotal  1,397  21.30%  38.50% 
 Total  3,630  55.40%  100.00% 
Private proceedings         
 Class actions    210  3.20%  n.a. 
 NASD arbitrations    1,720  26.20%  n.a. 
 NYSE arbitrations    994  15.20%  n.a. 
 Total   2,924  44.60%  n.a. 
Grand total: private and public    6,554  100.00%  n.a. 
       
Section B: monetary sanctions (millions of US$) 




Public proceedings         
 SEC    2,164.7  24.60%  40.90% 
 DOJ    766.5  8.70%  14.50% 
 State agencies (estimated)    1,114.9  12.70%  21.10% 
 Subtotal    4,046.1  46.10%  76.50% 
 NASD    1,078.3  12.30%  20.40% 
 NYSE    163.1  1.90%  3.10% 
 Subtotal    1,241.3  14.10%  23.50% 
 Total   5,287.5  60.20%  100.00% 
Private proceedings         
 Class actions    3,336.3  38.00%  n.a. 
 NASD arbitrations    162.3  1.80%  n.a. 
 NYSE arbitrations        n.a. 
 Total   3,498.7  39.80%  n.a. 
Grand total: private and public    8,786.2  100.00%  n.a. 
 Grand total adjusted for double 
counting    8,176.7  93.10%  n.a. 
Source: Jackson (2006, Table 14, p. 113)   38 
2.4.2 Major Fraud and Inter-Agency Mechanisms 
The lengthy delays  and the failure to obtain any convictions in connection with the Bre-X 
scandal  recently  highlighted  the  difficulties  faced  by  Canadian  regulators  in  securing 
convictions in major fraud cases. This state of affairs seems to be in stark contrast with the 
situation that followed, in the United States, after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, among 
others. The Canadian situation in this regard differs considerably from that in several countries 
where  the  fight  against  major  fraud  and  against  economic  crimes,  in  general,  takes  place 
through the creation of specialized national entities that bring together parties from the various 
agencies and departments involved.  
In the United Kingdom, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)
29 was created in 1987 to address public 
dissatisfaction with the lack of detection and prosecution of major fraud cases. The main 
recommendation of the Roskill Report
30 commissioned in order to guide the government in this 
matter  was:  ―the  setting  up  of  a  new  unified  organisation  responsible  for  the  detection, 
investigation and prosecution of serious fraud cases.‖ The SFO reports to the justice department 
and is responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases of fraud that involve amounts in 
excess of £1 million (C$2 million). Moreover, the London police has a renowned fraud squad 
that cooperates with the SFO. 
In the United States, the Fraud Section of the Department of Justice is responsible for complex 
prosecutions  involving  securities  as  well  as  economic  crimes  and  Internet  fraud.
31  The 
Corporate Fraud Task Force (the ―Task Force‖),
32 established by the President of the United 
States following the financial scandals, boasts a total of 1,236 convictions in major fraud cases. 
The Task Force is also responsible for having paid out to victims of fraud more than one billion 
dollars confiscated from the perpetrators of those frauds. In Enron alone, charges were laid 
against  36  persons,  including  former  CEO  Kenneth  Lay.  The  Task  Force  brings  together 
officials from the Department of Justice, seven U.S. attorneys, and the persons in charge of the 
following  entities:  the  Departments  of  Treasury  and  Labor,  the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission,  the  Commodity  Futures  Trading  Commission,  the  Federal  Energy  Regulatory 
                                                 
29 http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about/creation.asp 
30 An analysis of this important report was conducted by Levi (1986) 
31 The description and the activity reports of the Fraud Section are available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
32 http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/   39 
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development‘s Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight. The proceedings initiated during the five years of existence of the Task Force have 
covered fraud involving securities, insider trading, market manipulation, backdating of options, 
money  laundering  and  Internet  fraud.  The  Task  Force  emphasizes  the  importance  of 
cooperation  among  participants:  ―Over  the  past  five  years,  the  task  force  has  increased 
cooperation among federal agencies and leveraged the resources of the federal government to 
combat corporate fraud.‖ The sharing of information with prosecutors and other stakeholders is 
cited as a major advance.
33 In New Zealand, a similar department was cre ated in 1990: ―The 
Serious  Fraud  Office  (SFO)  is  a  Government  Department  that  detects,  investigates  and 
prosecutes cases of serious and complex fraud. The SFO Act 1990 gives the SFO powers to 
obtain evidence during the course of its investigations.‖
34  
Canada adopted, belatedly and cautiously, this method for fighting major fraud and economic 
crime. Those in charge acknowledge that ―law enforcement activity is only one component 
required to effectively protect the capital markets. To be truly effective, a strong integration is 
essential between law enforcement, securities commissions, Investment Dealers Associations of 
Canada, Market  Regulation  Services,  Mutual Fund Dealers Association  of Canada, Canada 
Revenue  Agency  and  the  Public  Prosecution  Service  of  Canada.‖
35  The  Integrated  Market 
Enforcement Teams (IMETs) were established at the end of 2003 in Toronto and Vancouver. 
According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),
36 their goal is to ―detect, charge 
and prosecute those using capital markets to harm the economic interests of Canadians. The 
RCMP manages the IMET program and works in partnership with the Department of Justice 
Canada  and  Public  Safety  and  Emergency  Preparedness  Canada.  The  IMET  program  also 
enjoys support from the Department of Finance Canada. The investigative teams work closely 
with  securities  regulators,  representatives  of  other  federal  enforcement  agencies,  law 
enforcement agencies of local jurisdiction and forensic accountants.‖ The IMETs appear to still 
                                                 
33 See the press release at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/July/07_odag_507.html 
34 http://www.sfo.govt.nz/ 
35 Deposition of Pierre-Yves Bourduas, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Services and Central Region, 
Royal  Canadian  Mounted  Police,  before  the  Standing  Senate  Committee  on  Banking,  Trade  and 
Commerce, June 3, 2007 (p. 25-7) at http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/bank-
e/pdf/25issue.pdf 
36 http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/fio/imets_brochure_e.pdf   40 
be at the development and implementation stage. In May 2007, Mr. Nick Le Pan, the former 
federal  Superintendent  of Financial  Institutions,  was  appointed senior  expert advisor to  the 
RCMP  on  IMETs.  He  is  to  make  recommendations  (in  October  2007)  to  improve  the 
functioning of this  group. The companion document to  Budget  2007  (Creating a Canadian 
Advantage in Global Capital Markets) indicates that a plan will be implemented ―to improve 
the effectiveness of the IMETs (...) [in order to]: attract and retain the best-qualified police and 
other  expert  resources  to  conduct  and  support  investigations  into  criminal  capital  market 
offences; strengthen the central coordination of the IMETs (…); improve coordination between 
the IMETs, securities regulators and provincial Crown prosecutors (…).‖ 
The hearings held by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce (June 
13, 2007)
37 provide a good illustration of the limited resources available for this initiative, and, 
in particular, the serious problem faced by the IMETs in recruiting and  retaining staff. The 
senators point out that the budget for the Manhattan district attorney‘s office alone, to fight 
white-collar crime, is four times the budget allocated to the IMETs for all of Canada. Moreover, 
officials emphasize that it is difficult to compare the Canadian and U.S. situations as regards the 
fight  against  economic  crime,  because  of  major  difference  in  the  legislative  framework: 
According to Mr. Constant (pp. 25-19) ―Their legislative framework is quite different from 
ours. If we want to hold that comparison, it is important to ensure we bring the legislative 
framework that supports that kind of enforcement. We do not have the grand jury style here in 
Canada. We do not have the partial immunity for suspects. We do not have the compelling 
evidence from witnesses.‖  
Securing convictions in cases of major fraud therefore seems to require the establishment of 
specialized  and  highly  integrated  groups,  of  which  the  securities  commissions  are  but  one 
component. By contrast with the United States and the United Kingdom, the creation of such an 
entity came late in Canada, the entity seems to have limited resources and its functioning is still 
in the early stages. 
                                                 
37 http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/bank-e/pdf/25issue.pdf 
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2.4.3 How Is the Canadian Situation Different? 
The foregoing may explain, in part, the existence of a critical situation as described by the 
Panel. However, a careful reading of the research commissioned by the Panel itself shows that 
its statements, as regards both findings and resources, can be qualified. 
The Findings 
In  Table  12,  we  have  supplemented  the  data  regarding  enforcement,  initially  compiled  by 
Jackson (2006). The Table illustrates changes in the number of legal proceedings initiated and 
the  number  of  penalties  imposed.  Jackson  writes  (p.  112):  ―I  do  think  that  there  is  strong 
evidence that the overall level of enforcement intensity has risen in Canada over the past few 
years.‖  
As of the second half of 2005, we incorporate into Table 10 data relating to actions initiated by 
the IDA (Investment Dealers Association), RS (Market Regulation Services) and the MFDA 
(Mutual Fund Dealers Association). These entities intervene relatively infrequently, compared 
with the situation observed in the United States (Table 9). Provincial regulators are responsible 
for  59%  of  legal  proceedings  and  89.1%  of  penalties  imposed  in  connection  with  public 
enforcement of securities laws. The author concludes that, based on the proceedings instituted, 
and  regardless  of  the  adjustment  factor  applied  in  order  to  compare  the  two  markets,  the 
likelihood of securities enforcement proceedings remains noticeably higher in the United States 
than in Canada. He highlights the much smaller role played by SROs in Canada, for which he 
establishes an ―enforcement ratio‖ of 17.2 to 1 (IDA) and 12.6 to 1 (RS). The corresponding 
ratio  is  5.2  to  1  for  the  securities  commissions.  In  addition,  private  legal  proceedings  are 
noticeably less significant in Canada than in the United States.   42 
Table 12 Changes in principal data on enforcement of securities laws in Canada, per six-month 
period, April 2004 to April 2007. Amounts are expressed in thousands of Canadian dollars. 















Number of disciplinary 
actions resolved    56    68    61    91    77    85    146   
Amount of penalties 
imposed    2,400    367,947    3,648    6,893    12,232    6,342    133,154   
Disgorgement    360    19,200    1,475    0    992    53    7,360   
Reimbursement of costs    634    293    392    944    638    882    1,261   
 
Total penalties, in ($000s)   3,394    387,440    5,514    7,837    13,862    7,277    141,775   
Source: Jackson (2006, Table 7, p.101) from April 2004 to September 2005 and annual reports of the 
CSA between October 2005 and March 2007   
Resources 
Comparing the costs and resources allocated to securities regulators is a delicate task when the 
size  of  the  markets  differs  as  much  as  do  the  Canadian  and  U.S.  markets.  The  various 
comparisons  carried  out  by  Jackson  (2006)  indicate  that  the  resources  allocated  to  the 
regulatory system seem proportionally greater in Canada, but he concludes that there is no 
significant difference in budgets or staffing levels. After adjusting for economies of scale, the 
level of resources is not abnormally different from the resources available in the United States. 
The main difference between the two countries lies in the budgets allocated per employee of the 
Canadian entities. These are lower than comparable numbers in the United States. 
The Canadian enforcement environment is improving, but still falls short of expectations and 
enforcement actions elsewhere. We have shown that the causes of this situation are varied. 
They cannot be attributed entirely to the provincial commission structure, and it also seems 
illusory to think that a single regulator could remedy the situation quickly. Indeed, the experts 
consulted by the Panel mention centralization as one of the factors, from among many others, 
that might improve enforcement. 
 
2.4.4 Is a Single Regulator the Solution and Would It Result in an Improvement? 
The majority of studies on this subject mention the centralization of securities regulation as one 
of the factors that might improve Canada‘s performance in matters of enforcement, but this is   43 
neither the only nor the main component. The study carried out by de C. Cory and Pilkington 
(2006) and commissioned by the Panel, makes the following recommendations to strengthen 
the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of securities offences: 
(1) Regulators and agencies should establish enforcement as a priority. 
(2) The mandate of IMETs with respect to investigations should be expanded, provincial 
interests should be taken into account, the recruitment and retention of staff should be 
improved and a senior  independent  review officer in  charge of strategies should be 
appointed for each IMET location. 
(3) Prosecutions should be coordinated nationally. 
(4) Adjudicative functions should be transferred to an independent specialized tribunal and 
judges should be better prepared to manage cases involving the financial markets. 
(5) Penalties: Discrepancies between the sanctions applied in the provinces seem to be a 
major  issue  for  the  Panel.  However,  this  situation  exists  in  the  United  States,  even 
within the framework of uniform regulation. Weiss (2001) and Loomis (2000) write that 
different courts in the United States have expressed completely different opinions on 
matters such as insider trading.
38 The report recommends that penalties be harmonized 
across the country, that guidelines be established for provincial offences and th at the 
costs of prosecutions be recoverable. 
(6) Redress for harm to investors: The regulatory system should be structured so as to allow 
for disgorgement or compensation to victims of financial crime and so as to provide 
investors with the possibility of instituting proceedings based on a court or tribunal 
finding of misconduct. 
(7) Self-regulatory  organizations  (SROs):  The  roles,  jurisdiction  and  powers  of  SROs 
should be reviewed. 
(8) National management of enforcement: Allow for a better use of resources and a better 
development of skills. The authors see numerous limits in the current structure of the 
IMETs,  which  further  complicate  matters  as  regards  the  acquisition  of  skills.  They 
consider IMETs to be a largely inadequate response to the enforcement challenge.  
                                                 
38  Loomis (2000) illustrates these discrepancies as follows: ―The 9th Circuit has articulated the most 
defence-friendly standard. Its 1999 decision in re Silicon Graphics Inc Securities Litigation, 183 F3d 
970,  affirming  a  1997  decision  from  the  Northern  District  of  California,  requires  pleadings  to 
provide  ‗in  great  detail,  facts  that  constitute  circumstantial  evidence  of  deliberately  reckless  or 
conscious misconduct.‘ Stock sales before a steep drop in stock market value alone do not satisfy the 
standard. The winds blow in a different direction on the East Coast. In 1998, the Southern District of 
New York ruled that a plaintiff claiming fraud need plead only that the defendant had ‗motive and 
opportunity,‘  a  standard  that  can  be  met,  for  example,  by  alleging  stock  sales  by  corporate 
executives before a surprise announcement that causes stock prices to drop. This year, the 2nd 
Circuit affirmed the ruling in Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F3d 300, although the parties disagree as to the 
grounds of the statement.‖    44 
Centralized enforcement is but one of eight sets of measures proposed by these experts who 
were enlisted by the Panel. In fact, it is possible to provide for national enforcement by way of 
cooperation.  The  authors  conclude:  ―Whatever  the  results  may  be  of  the  negotiations  to 
establish a unified or harmonized approach to securities regulation, it remains fundamentally 
important  that the approach to  enforcement be managed on a national  basis. A centralized 
approach would facilitate the efficient use of resources in the development and deployment of 
the special knowledge and skills that are required for the effective investigation, prosecution 
and  adjudication  of  complex  securities  matters.‖  Thus,  the  study  does  not  conclude  that 
centralized regulation is an essential condition for strict enforcement of the law. 
3 THE ISSUE OF COSTS 
3.1 THE COST ARGUMENT  
The argument regarding the excessive cost of Canadian securities regulation is put forward, on 
a recurrent basis, to justify the centralization of the Canadian regulatory system. Regulation 
results in compliance costs as well as direct costs. We discussed the issue of compliance costs 
for new issuers in section 2.2. Here, we address two other aspects that we believe are important, 
namely, the costs to investors and direct costs. Investors bear costs when buying and selling 
securities on the secondary market. Direct costs are those related to the securities commissions. 
They are generally labelled as excessive, and certain reports argue that is it possible to reduce 
them significantly (Wise Persons‘ Committee, 2003 p. 34). Below, we answer the following 
questions: 
(1) Can it be said that the costs borne by investors in Canada are higher due to the 
regulatory system? 
(2) Are direct costs of regulation excessive in Canada, compared with direct costs in 
other countries? 
(3) Are indirect costs a major problem? 
(4) Would it be possible to reduce the costs significantly by creating a single securities 
regulator?   45 
3.2 INVESTOR COSTS 
The  regulatory  costs  borne  by  investors  should  be  a  major  consideration.  Previously,  we 
mentioned the significant shift of trades in Canadian securities cross-listed in the United States; 
these securities are now traded to the same extent in both countries. This shift constitutes a 
considerable challenge for the Canadian market, and the possibility of trading at a lower cost is 
one of the factors that explains the shift in trading activity. Investors are subject to a variety of 
costs—regulation is but a relatively minor component. It is possible to argue that the costs 
resulting from regulatory mechanisms are, ultimately, borne by both groups of users, namely, 
issuers and investors. It therefore seems appropriate to consider these direct regulatory costs in 
relation to the total costs supported by both these groups. 
In Canada, according to the TSX Review, trading volume on the TSX reached $1,075 billion in 
2005. If trading costs are similar to those in the United States, investors, as a whole, paid 
1,075 x 0.0075  =  $8.063  billion.  Jackson  (2006)  assesses  the  total  cost  of  securities 
commissions in Canada at $143.3 million (Table 1, p. 90), which represents 1.77% of trading 
costs. In Canada, a reduction in trading costs from 0.75% to 0.737% would have as much effect 
on  the  total  costs  directly  incurred  by  the  markets  as  would  abolishing  all  securities 
commissions. The trading costs in Canada for medium and small-cap securities are very high. 
For example, Cleary et al. (2002) set these costs at 1.3% for securities trading at between $15 
and $20, when a discount broker is used. They amount to 3% if a full-service broker is used. 
The 0.75% estimate used here  applies  to  trades carried out  over the  Internet  and to  liquid 
securities  trading  at  high  prices,  as  well  as  to  institutional  investors.  We  have  therefore 
underestimated the total cost borne by investors. It is also possible to consider regulatory costs 
in relation to revenues in the Canadian securities industry. In 2003, revenues were $10.6 billion 
and  commission  costs were  approximately  $110  million.  The  relationship  between  the  two 
amounts  is  also  in  the order  of  1.03%.  Reducing  the  regulatory  burden  is  a  commendable 
objective. However, it is clear that regulation is only responsible for a very negligible fraction 
of the costs borne by issuers and investors in Canada. Attributing the relative inefficiency of the 
Canadian markets solely to the costs of regulation ignores the fact that the bulk of trading costs 
is linked to the functioning of the markets and to brokerage commissions, which are primarily 
under the control of the brokerage industry itself. It is obviously possible to argue that the costs   46 
are  essentially  indirect.  Beyond  the  facts  presented  above,  we  also  refer  to  the  study 
commissioned on this subject by the Wise Persons‘ Committee (Anand and Klein, 2003). 
3.3 ARE INDIRECT COSTS A MAJOR PROBLEM? 
Indirect costs are examined in the study by Anand and Klein on four levels: registrants, IPOs, 
exempt market transactions and acquisition transactions. 
As regards registrants, the authors write: ―While material incremental compliance costs were 
not the norm for our case study participants, smaller firms are less able to bear these costs and 
consequently  are  more  likely  to  find  them  to  be  material.  Thus,  the  existence  of  multiple 
securities regulators in Canada may impose a competitive disadvantage on smaller firms.‖ 
With respect to IPOs, the authors state the following: ―Because we have not found material 
incremental costs with respect to the IPOs that we examined, we have no basis on which to 
conclude that one model is preferred to any other or even that any of the alternative models is 
preferred to the current system.‖ 
As  regards  exempt  market  transactions,  they  state  the  following:  ―Material  incremental 
compliance costs were not the norm for our case study participants. However, smaller issuers 
are less able to bear these costs and consequently are more likely to find them to be material. 
Thus,  the  existence  of  multiple  securities  regulators  in  Canada  may  impose  a  competitive 
disadvantage on smaller issuers.‖ 
Finally, as regards acquisition transactions, the authors write: ―In acquisition transactions where 
regulatory hearings  were held,  case study  participants  reported opportunity cost  risk which 
related to the delays that may arise if multiple regulators are involved in the hearings.‖ 
In none of the cases did the researchers show ―material‖ costs
39 that could constitute the norm. 
Additional costs related to multiple regulation are therefore, most often, negligible. Apparently, 
there are a few cases where issuers or smaller registrants may have to bear costs that may 
penalize them more heavily than larger institutions, as is the case with any regulation. On the 
basis of evidence shown in support of the Wise Persons‘ Committee report, it is difficult to 
argue that the present structure imposes a significant additional cost on Canadian participants.  
                                                 
39 The concept of materiality is commonly used in accounting to distinguish between what must be 
reported and what need not be reported.   47 
3.4 ARE SECURITIES REGULATORY COSTS DISPROPORTIONATE IN CANADA? 
It  is  routine  to  state  that  Canadian  regulatory  costs  are  abnormally  high  in  relation  to  the 
capitalization of the Canadian market or in relation to the gross national product. The source for 
data relating to costs is generally the Financial Services Authority, which, since 2003, has kept 
track of four components of securities regulatory costs.
40 In 2003, the direct costs related to 
these components were £73.8 million in Australia, £56.8 in Canada, £37 in the United Kingdom 
and £977.3 in the United States. As a percentage of total capitalization, the amounts were 
0.029%, 0.015%, 0.004% and 0.014% respectively. However, the responsibilities of regulators 
are more a function of the number of listed issuers than they are a function of capitalization. It 
is possible to calculate a cost per listed issuer. It is $123,000 in Australia, $33,600 in Canada, 
$37,300 in the United Kingdom, and $324,700 in the United States. It therefore seems difficult 
to claim, on this basis, that the direct costs of regulation are higher in Canada than in other 
countries in which market practices are rather similar. 
3.5 WOULD A SINGLE REGULATOR REDUCE COSTS? 
The argument regarding the reduction of costs originates essentially from the Charles Rivers 
Associates analysis (2003), which has several important limitations: 
  It analyzes, together, very different structures with varying responsibilities (provinces, 
states, countries). 
  Securities activity is measured on the basis of the GNP. This is particularly inaccurate in 
the United States, where the GNP at the state level is included in the country-wide GNP. 
It  is  well-known  that  the  GNP  is  not  proportional  to  securities  activity  or  to 
capitalization. 
  A single measurement of the cost differences for each factors is taken into account, 
namely, the cost of living. 
  The  relationship  between  securities  activity  and  the  direct  cost  of  regulation  is 
considered to be linear, which is certainly not the case. 
However, the main issue is the following. The savings referred to in the report of the Wise 
Persons‘  Committee,  namely  $46.6  million  per  year,  are  associated  with  a  model  whose 
securities regulatory and oversight activity is practically nonexistent in all provinces, except 
                                                 
40 These components are: (1) Securities firms and fund management firms - prudential supervision, (2) 
Supervision  of  and  standards  for  exchanges  /  clearing  and  settlement  systems  /  market  service 
providers (3) Supervision of, and standards for conduct on, capital markets (including transaction 
reporting but excluding exchange‘s own rules) and (4) Standards for / approval of listing of securities.   48 
Ontario. Table 13, which summarizes the information provided in Tables 19 and 20 of the 
Charles Rivers Associates study, illustrates this clearly:  
Table 13 Cost of securities regulation in Canada, based on the Charles Rivers Associates 
model (Tables 19 and 20). 
  Actual  New regime  Savings 
All of Canada  127.8     46.6 
Ontario Head Office     70.2    
Alberta Branch     2    
British Columbia Branch     2.8    
Manitoba Branch      1.4    
Nova Scotia Branch      1.2    
Québec Branch     3.6    
 
Thus, Québec would only be left with $3.6 million to assume its remaining responsibilities with 
respect to securities. This amount only allows for minimal activity. Approximately 90% of its 
current activities would be eliminated.  
The configuration that would give rise to the savings referred to in the report of the Wise 
Persons‘ Committee consists in abolishing virtually all securities commissions other than 
the Ontario Securities Commission. This model is inconsistent with the proposal in the report, 
which suggests maintaining a significant local presence and the use of provincial expertise. 
According  to  the  Charles  Rivers  Associates  study,  Ontario  would  be  responsible  for 
substantially all securities regulation in Canada through a $14 million increase in  operating 
expenditures for the Ontario Securities Commission, compared with the existing budget. This 
seems rather unrealistic.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
An analysis of regulatory costs indicates that there is little evidence showing that the current 
regulatory  structure  leads  to  significant  costs  for  investors  or  issuers.  The  direct  costs  of 
regulatory authorities are lower than those incurred in other countries, when expressed on the 
basis  of  the  number  of  reporting  issuers.  Finally,  arguments  to  the  effect  that  a  single 
commission would generate substantial savings are less than convincing.    49 
4 CONCLUSION 
In the first part of this paper, we documented the fact that Canada is, by far, the country that 
offers  growth  companies  the  best  possibilities  for  initial  financings,  exchange  listings  and 
subsequent financings. The direct costs of offerings are lower than those in the United States for 
offerings of the same size, time frames are shorter than those in the United States and, in 
particular, the cost of financing for small issuers, measured by the returns earned by investors, 
is favourable to issuers. These market characteristics provide issuers with a considerably higher 
life expectancy at the time of an offering than that observed for offerings by more mature 
companies in other countries, including the United States. Improvements are certainly possible, 
but it is difficult to argue that the existing regulatory structure has been an obstacle to the 
development of solutions tailored to the financing of growth companies. The experts mandated 
by  the  Panel  emphasized  the  importance  of  taking  steps  to  reduce  the  cost  of  corporate 
financing. We have shown that, in general, this cost is identical to that in the United States. For 
issuers, it seems abnormally favourable, especially in the case of growth companies.  
We analyzed Canada‘s competitive position. First, it must be recognized that the Canadian 
market is not a large-cap market. At the end of 2006, 73% of the 60 Canadian securities with 
the highest capitalization were also listed in the United States, and the percentage of trades 
carried out in that country is increasing on a regular basis. The Canadian market is therefore 
essentially reserved for medium and small-cap securities. The Panel‘s suggestion to implement 
a  principles-based  regulatory  system,  in  imitation  of  AIM,  so  as  to  attract  foreign  issuers 
merited analysis. However, there is a significant risk that it will exclude a large number of 
Canadian  issuers  from  the  market.  Moreover,  the  economic  and  geographical  conditions 
governing  competition  between  markets  do  not  seem  favourable  in  Canada.  The  experts 
mandated by the Panel advise against the implementation in Canada of a system based on AIM 
for the listing of new issuers.  
With respect to enforcement, numerous factors other than the securities regulatory structure can 
explain the fact that Canada has performed below expectations. The experts consulted by the 
Panel produced reports suggesting multiple avenues for solutions. Centralizing the securities 
commissions is certainly one of those avenues, but it is not the only one and, indeed, does not 
even seem to be the main avenue suggested.    50 
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